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1. Introduction 
China’s developing economy is one of the most important in the world. Firms are 
transitioning from previous state owned enterprises (SOEs) to modern firms. As 
market reforms deepen in China it is important to investigate how firms provide 
incentives to their top executives. Would we expect executive compensation and 
corporate governance in a socialist country such as China to look like it does in the 
US? The surprising result of our study is that in some respects it does. We document 
that economic drivers of executive pay, such as firm size and performance, are 
important in China as they are in the US. We show too that corporate governance is 
evolving in China mimicking important features of boards in the US, such as the 
adoption of independent directors and compensation committees. 
This study investigates the relation between executive pay and firm 
performance in China’s publicly traded firms from 2001 to 2005. By investigating the 
pay-for-performance relation we provide valuable information for assessing current 
and future market reforms. We use two data sets that cover all firms listed on China’s 
domestic stock exchanges, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 1  The 
institutional context in China is very important. First, the ownership structure of 
China’s publicly traded firms is very distinct. Share ownership is often in the hands of 
the State, although (as we show) private control of firms is becoming more common. 
In addition, ownership is highly concentrated, especially by Anglo-Saxon standards. 
Publicly traded firms often have a single dominant shareholder. This raises important 
questions as to how effective market reforms might be, and whether appropriate 
                                                
1 The number of firms listed on the two major exchanges of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges has increased from 57 in 1992 to 1434 in December 2006 with a total market capitalization 
of 89,403 billion RMB (or about US$11,462 billion). The size of China’s stock market in August 2007 
had a total market capitalization of approximately 245,300 billion RMB, surpassing the size of 
Japanese stock market.  
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incentives are provided to senior managers. Also, the different types of ownership 
may imply that there are different objectives for the firm. The State control of firms 
may insulate inefficient managers or fail to provide appropriate financial incentives. 
We investigate the effect of State control on the setting of executive pay in China’s 
listed companies. Specifically, we examine whether the link between pay and firm 
performance is stronger in privately controlled (i.e. non-State controlled) firms.  
A second institutional feature we explore is the role of the board of directors, 
especially the effect of independent directors. China’s listed firms have two-tier 
boards: a main board of directors and a supervisory board. Traditionally executives 
are often state-appointed bureaucrats whose effectiveness in delivering shareholder 
value has been questioned (Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007, Xi, 2006). Since the early 
2000s China’s public firms have been under pressure from investors to reform (Allen, 
Qian, and Qian 2005; Jingu 2007). Increasingly, China has adopted Anglo-Saxon 
style corporate governance reforms, especially in relation to the board of directors. A 
salient example of this is the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (2002). This code required firms to adopt best 
practice corporate governance structures, including adding independent directors to 
the board of directors, and separating the posts of CEO and chairperson. If these 
pressures reflect a tendency for increased quality of corporate governance then we 
would expect to observe different patterns of executive compensation and incentives. 
We examine whether the link between pay and firm performance is stronger in firms 
that have a greater proportion of independent directors on the board.  
We make several significant contributions to the existing literature. First, we 
provide empirical evidence on the relation between CEO pay and firm performance 
from 2001 to 2005. This is the ultimate goal of the study. We estimate executive pay 
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equations that control for ownership structure, boardroom governance and the quality 
of management via firm fixed effects. We also estimate the elasticity of pay to 
performance by regressing the change in CEO pay on the change in shareholder value 
of the firm (Murphy, 1985). Overall, our study finds a positive and significant link 
between executive pay and firm performance. The empirical evidence also suggests 
that the pay-for-performance relation is stronger in non-State controlled firms and in 
firms with a greater proportion of independent directors on the board. The results 
attest to the importance of China’s recent corporate governance and market reforms. 
Second, we estimate the relation between the value of CEO shareholdings and 
firm performance. Previous executive pay studies using Chinese data have focused 
exclusively on cash compensation rather than CEO share ownership. However, 
studies using Western data document that incentives from equity ownership are very 
important, especially compared to cash compensation (Core and Guay, 1999; Hall, 
and Liebman 1998; Core et al. 2003; Conyon, and Murphy 2000; Murphy 1999). We 
show that the value of CEO share ownership is indeed important in China. The 
estimated value of the CEOs share ownership is significantly greater than cash 
compensation. The ownership of shares provides an important mechanism to align 
interests of CEOs and owners, as well as to focus CEO effort on value creation. In 
short, it is another way to measure the CEO pay-for-performance link. 
Third, we investigate the relation between CEO turnover and firm 
performance as a complementary discipline mechanism to compensation incentives. 
Overall, we find that CEOs are replaced for poor stock performance. There is also a 
negative correlation between CEO turnover and accounting measures of firm 
performance. Corporate governance contingencies are important. We find little 
evidence of a significant statistical relation between CEO turnover and stock market 
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performance in State controlled firms. In contrast, CEOs of privately controlled firms 
are statistically more likely to be replaced for poor stock price performance. We also 
find that CEOs are more likely to be replaced for poor stock market performance in 
firms if they have a higher proportion of independent directors on the board. Again, 
the results demonstrate the importance of China’s corporate governance reforms. 
Finally, we compare executive compensation in China to the United States. 
This unique aspect of our analysis adds to a growing literature on international 
executive compensation. We find that American executives earn about seventeen 
times more than their Chinese counterparts, although the effect is reduced after 
controlling for economic and governance factors. The econometric results show that 
many of the same variables determine pay in each country, particularly firm size, 
performance, and boardroom governance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a 
brief explanation of the institutional context and hypothesis motivation. Section three 
explains the data and outlines the empirical models. Section four contains the main 
empirical results on the determinants of executive pay in China. Section five contrasts 
executive pay in China to pay in the US. Section six provides a conclusion. 
2. Institutional context and motivation 
Comparatively little is known about executive compensation and CEO equity 
incentives in China, especially relative to Anglo-Saxon economies (Kato and Long, 
2006b).2 We investigate the determinants of executive pay in China’s listed firms 
from 2001 to 2005. Our study makes an important distinction between cash 
compensation pay and incentives arising from the CEOs ownership of shares. Cash 
                                                
2  Our study investigates the determinants of executive pay and equity ownership in China’s 
domestically listed firms, and the performance of their A shares. Other studies consider the 
determinants and consequences of executive pay in Hong Kong’s Red Chip firms (Chen, Guan, and 
Ke, 2010; Ke et al., 2009; Magnan and Li, 2008). 
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compensation measures the flow of pay received by an executive per time period. In 
contrast, the stock of CEO share ownership provides direct financial incentives to 
increase shareholder value (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Murphy 1999; Core et al. 
2003). In addition, we argue that it is important to control for firm and managerial 
quality via firm fixed effects in the pay regressions. In the following section, we 
consider briefly the institutional context and how it affects our empirical executive 
compensation models. 
Executive compensation in China 
We investigate executive pay in China. The standard economic theory of executive 
compensation is the principal-agent model (Holmstrom 1979; Mirrlees 1997, 1976; 
Murphy 1999). It predicts that firms design efficient compensation packages to solve 
moral hazards and motivate CEOs.3 The theoretical model posits a risk-neutral 
principal who designs an optimal contract for a risk and effort-averse agent in the 
presence of a moral hazard problem. Boards set CEO pay and incentives based on 
economic factors, the magnitude of agency problems, and monitoring difficulty in 
order to align shareholder and managerial interests (Core et al. 2003; Core, and Guay 
1999; Fama, and Jensen 1983b; Jensen, and Meckling 1976).4 Agency theory predicts 
that executive pay is positively correlated to firm performance. It is, however, 
relatively silent on the functional form of the estimating equation (e.g. whether to use 
current or lagged performance measures) and other types of variables to be included. 
Holmstrom’s (1979) “informativeness” principle predicts that any variable that is 
                                                
3 Murphy (1999) provides an authoritative review of the economic determinants of CEO pay and 
empirical evidence amassed for the US economy. 
 
4 The contract approach is standard in the accounting, finance and economics literature. Core, Guay, 
and Larcker (2003) define an efficient (or optimal) contract as one that: “that maximizes the net 
expected economic value to shareholders after transaction costs (such as contracting costs) and 
payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is that … contracts minimize agency costs.” 
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informative about CEO effort can be contracted upon. In our empirical work we 
control for a set of economic and corporate governance variables that have been 
shown to be important in previous research (Core et. al., 1999).  
 Compensation disclosure is different in China compared to the US. Chinese 
Security Law (1999) requires that listed firms disclose information about management 
shareholdings. The Chinese Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) regulates the 
disclosure of executive compensation information. Early regulation did not require 
listed firms to disclose complete executive compensation information in their annual 
reports (CSRC, 1998). Since 2001 publicly traded firms are required to report the sum 
of total compensation for the three highest-paid management and the three highest-
paid board members (including executive board members). Compensation disclosure 
was not required for each individual separately from 2001 to 2005, which is the time 
period of our study (CSRC, 2000, 2002). 
However, there have been further changes in disclosure rules. From 2006 
onward publicly traded firms are required to report each individual board member and 
top management’s total compensation as the sum of salary, bonus, stipends, and other 
benefits (CSRC, 2005, 2007). In addition, firms are also required to disclose 
information on stock options, including total exercisable shares, exercised shares, 
exercising price, market price at the reporting time.5 
Existing China pay studies have shown a positive correlation between pay and 
performance. Early research by Mengistae and Xu (2004) examined CEO pay in 
                                                
5 In 2005, the CSRC launched a structural reform program aimed at eliminating non-tradable shares. 
The reform required listed companies to transfer non-tradable shares to tradable shares by 
compensating existing shareholders in various ways by offering bonus shares, cash and stock options. 
This reform was accompanied by a series of changes in the Corporate Law and Security Law, which 
also paved the way for granting stock options to executives. Effective from 2006, the new rule allow 
publicly traded firms that have successfully completed structural reforms to offer stock options or 
restricted stocks to their higher management, board and supervisory board members, excluding 
independent board members, CSRC (2005). 
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approximately 400 Chinese state-owned enterprises in the 1980s using survey data. 
They find the CEO pay sensitivity decreases with the variance of performance.  More 
recently, Kato and Long (2006b) investigated a sample of 937 publicly traded firms in 
China from 1998 to 2002. They find that executive cash compensation is positively 
related to firm performance. They also find some evidence that the pay-for-
performance link is weaker in State owned firms. Firth, Fung and Rui (2007, 2006) 
examined a sample of 549 listed firms in China from 1998 to 2000. They too find that 
cash compensation is related to firm performance and that China’s distinct ownership 
affects the level of cash pay. We build on these by investigating a later period when 
market reforms have deepened, and use a much larger set of approximately 1300 
firms from 2001 to 2005. Chen et al (2010a) also demonstrate a positive correlation of 
pay to performance. Our study is appreciably different from theirs. We investigate the 
pay-for-performance relation controlling for management quality via firm fixed-
effects, the role of ownership structure, and the effect of independent directors on the 
main board. In addition, and in contrast to all previous studies, we compare executive 
compensation in China to the US. 
Ownership of publicly traded firms in China 
We argue that China’s distinct pattern of ownership and control has 
implications for the determination of executive pay. There are three major classes of 
share ownership. First, the State owns shares, held through government agencies. 
Second, legal entities can own shares, held through state controlled legal persons, or 
privately controlled legal persons. Finally, individuals, institutions, and private 
businesses can own shares privately. When a State-owned-enterprise (SOE) is listed, 
only a small proportion of equity is sold to private investors in the IPO process. The 
state and parent SOEs still retain sufficient shares in the form of state shares or legal 
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person shares to retain voting control, which typically accounts for two thirds of total 
shares outstanding (Qian, 1995). State shares and legal entity shares are (generally) 
non-tradable. There are circumstances when they can be exchanged, but the process is 
complex (Xu, 2004). A reform was undergoing to make all shares tradable starting 
from 2005. In addition, a Chinese company may also issue three types of tradable 
shares. Tradable “A” shares are listed on the two domestic exchanges (Shanghai and 
Shenzhen) to domestic investors and denominated in Renminbi (RMB). “B” shares 
are issued to foreign investors traded in either US dollar or Hong Kong dollar. 
Finally, a Chinese firm may also trade on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and issue 
so called “H” share. Our study deals with performance arising from the “A” shares 
traded in domestic stock exchanges.  
The ownership of China’s publicly traded firms is highly concentrated. In 
most firms there is a single dominant shareholder whose large share ownership gives 
considerable power and influence over the way the firm is run. This is especially the 
case regarding the appointment and compensation of the CEO or the board. Typically, 
the largest shareholder owns about 43% of the firm’s shares, the second largest about 
9%, and the third largest about 4% (see Section 4 below). Our figures are consistent 
with those produced by Xu (2004).6 China’s ownership pattern stands in stark contrast 
to the US, where low-concentration and ownership diffusion is the norm. It is rare for 
investors to own more than 10% of common equity in Anglo-Saxon firms. 
Ownership concentration has important consequences for the pattern of 
executive compensation and CEO equity incentives (Core et al., 1999). Agency 
theory predicts that when ownership is dispersed, individual owners have weak 
incentives to invest in monitoring and to exert influence over key corporate decisions 
                                                
6 Xu (2004) finds the largest shareholder percentage is 46.23%, the second largest is 6.96% and the 
third largest is 2.85%. This is based on a study of Chinese firm ownership from 1996 to 2001. 
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(Fama, and Jensen 1983a; Jensen et al. 1976). This free-rider problem may be 
mitigated by concentrated share ownership. A high equity stake in the company 
provides block-holders and controlling shareholders with strong incentives to 
supervise managerial activities (Jensen, and Warner 1988). As a result, concentrated 
ownership often indicates that shareholders are able to better guard their interests in 
their firms. Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) and Shivdasani (1993) thus hypothesize 
that large share stakes by outside shareholders will also mitigate potential CEO 
entrenchment and is predicted to be negatively correlated with CEO compensation. 
Also, more concentrated ownership may suggest the optimal contract contains fewer 
financial incentives to motivate the CEO, especially if monitoring and equity 
incentives are substitutes. This suggests that CEO equity incentives are a decreasing 
function of ownership concentration. Set against the beneficial effects of concentrated 
ownership are the costs associated with entrenchment and private benefits of control 
of a single large shareholder. Large shareholders may expropriate minority 
shareholders, or promote their own objectives over those of other shareholders. This 
may occur via tunneling or other rent extraction strategies (La Porta et al. 1998, 
2000). The problem of expropriation by controlling shareholders is extremely severe 
in Chinese stock markets because of a more primitive disclosure system and weak 
corporate governance mechanisms (Ding et al., 2007).  
The type of ownership is also important. When the State is the firm’s ultimate 
owner the CEO is more likely to be a bureaucrat (Firth et. al. 2007) and managerial 
quality may be lower. Instead, managerial quality may be higher in privately 
controlled firms. This increased demand for managerial talent suggests that 
equilibrium wages will be lower in state controlled firms. In addition, private 
ownership is likely to result in compensation contracts that focus managerial behavior 
 11 
on maximizing firm value. Conversely, state controlled firms might pursue political or 
multiple objectives, such as employment growth, rather than profit maximization. 
Privately owned firms, therefore, are expected to set optimal contracts with greater 
pay-for-performance incentives. To summarize, we expect the type of firm ownership 
to impact the level of executive compensation, pay-for-performance and the provision 
of equity incentives in China’s publicly traded firms.  
Boards of directors in China’s publicly traded firms 
As noted in the introduction, China operates a two-tier board system 
consisting of a main board of directors and a supervisory board. Traditionally, the 
state has huge influence on the appointment of board and supervisory board members. 
An enduring concern is that state-appointed bureaucrats are ineffective in monitoring 
management (Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007, Hu et al, 2010). In response to 
shareholder pressure, and deepening market reforms, China’s listed firms have 
increasingly adopted Anglo-Saxon style internal corporate governance structures 
(Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005; Jingu 2007; and Chen et al 2010a). An important 
example of this is the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (2002). This code required firms to add independent 
directors to the main board of directors and separate the posts of CEO and 
chairperson. The expectation is that one-third of the board should comprise 
independent directors. The corporate governance code defines director independence 
as: “The independent director shall be independent from the listed company that 
employs them and the company's major shareholders.”7 Unlike earlier studies we 
focus on this precise definition of independence, not just non-executive directors. If 
these pressures reflect a tendency for increased quality of corporate governance then 
                                                
7A non-executive director may be independent, but not necessarily so. A non-executive does not hold a 
position in the listed firm but they may hold a position in the parent company or major shareholder of 
the firm. 
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we would expect to observe different patterns of executive compensation and 
incentives. In short, we expect the pay-for-performance link to be stronger in firms 
that have a greater proportion of independent directors on the board. 
In line with extant research, we assert that board structure will influence 
executive pay in China (Conyon, and Peck 1998; Core et al. 1999). It is frequently 
argued that the board of directors should consist of independent outside directors 
(Core et al. 1999, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).8 One reason for this is that inside 
directors are more loyal to the CEO or the CEO can exert power and influence over 
them by controlling factors such as their career opportunities. Outside directors, on 
the other hand, have incentives to effectively monitor the CEO because they are 
subject to less CEO influence and have reputations to protect in the labor market 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b). We expect, more independent directors on the board are 
associated with less managerial opportunism and more efficient contracts. 9  In 
addition, previous research argues that board effectiveness is influenced by the size of 
the board. Jensen (1993) argues that large boards are less effective than small boards, 
because they may suffer from free-riding problems in decision-making and control 
thereby diluting monitoring capabilities (see also Yermack 1996). Similarly boards 
that combine the posts of CEO and chairperson vest more power with the CEO, and 
may suffer greater agency costs (Jensen, 1993). Lastly, firms without compensation 
                                                
8 As in the USA and Anglo-Saxon firms, the nominating committee is an important mechanism by 
which directors get first nominated and then selected. We found that nomination committees are 
becoming an increasingly important phenomenon in China, since the governance reforms of 2002. The 
percentage of firms with nominating committees was only 4% in 2001; but in 2002 it was 21%, 30% in 
2003, 34% in 2004, and 37% in 2005. It appears that China’s listed firms are using the institution of 
nomination committees in order to help select and add members to the board of directors. 
 
9 Although majority voting is one way for independent directors to assert their influence, in practice 
they may be constrained. We suspect that power and political dynamics can have an important 
influence on board decisions and how the CEO, independent directors, State or other representatives 
interact. These board process issues are difficult to quantify and, unfortunately, we do not have 
variables to measure this. In addition, the State can be very powerful. The proportion of independent 
directors on the board is about one-third, so the non-independent State influenced directors can still 
have significant power and influence. 
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committees may be less effective at setting executive pay (Newman and Mozes, 1999; 
Conyon and Peck, 1998). In summary, our pay regressions include measures of 
independent directors, board size, combined CEO and chair position, and the presence 
of a compensation committee.  
3. Methods 
Data 
Our study uses data on publically traded Chinese firms listed on the domestic 
exchanges from 2001 to 2005. We combined two separate data sets. First, the 
executive compensation and corporate governance data were supplied by the China 
Center for Economic Research Sinofin Information Service (CCER/SinoFin). Second, 
the financial performance and accounting data are from the CSMAR-A financial 
database. Together these two data sets account for almost all firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The data sets have been used in previous 
research (Kato and Long 2006b). It is important to comment on the quality of the 
executive compensation and corporate governance data. The SinoFin data are 
collected directly from public firms’ annual financial reports as published in 
Securities Time, Shanghai Securities Daily, China Securities Daily, and other major 
newspapers designated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
Different individuals manually enter the data twice. This ensures coding accuracy and 
the integrity of the data. 
The following describes how we arrive at our final set of firms. The original 
combined data set (SinoFin and CSMAR-A) consisted of 1381 unique publicly traded 
firms on the two domestic Chinese exchanges for the years 2001 to 2005. These firms 
account for approximately 98% of all listed firms. The near universal coverage of 
firms helps attenuate selection biases, which may have been a cause for concern in 
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earlier studies. In order to estimate the statistical models we required non-missing 
data on executive compensation. This resulted in the deletion of only five firms. We 
also required non-missing data on ownership type (for example, State control), firm 
size, annual stock returns, return on assets, and boardroom variables such as the 
proportion of independent directors. Also, in our empirical work below we estimate 
panel data models using a first-difference strategy to eliminate firm fixed effects. This 
required the firms to have at least two consecutive years of data. Overall, the selection 
procedure resulted in a final sample of 1342 unique firms with 5928 firm-year 
observations.10 The panel data set has multiple time-series observations per firm (i.e. 
it is unbalanced) reflecting the fact that firms join or leave the stock exchanges.11  
Model estimation 
We estimate the following fixed-effects panel data model, controlling for firm size, 
ownership structure and boardroom governance: 
ln(PAY)it = αi + β1SHRit + β2ROAit + β3ln(SALES)it  + β4Xit +  εit   (1) 
The term ln(PAY)it is the logarithm of executive cash compensation in firm i at time t. 
Executive compensation is the aggregated pay of the top three officers, defined as the 
sum of basic salary, bonus, stipends, and other benefits. We divide the single 
aggregated pay figure by three to get an estimate of the average executive’s pay.12 
                                                
10 It is comforting that the selection procedure led to a loss of only 39 firms from the initial sample of 
1381 companies. We managed to keep about 97% of our original set of firms. 
 
11 The balance of the panel is as follows. There are 119 firms with 2 years of data (238 observations), 
96 firms with 3 years of data (288 firm-year observations), 233 firms with 4 years of data (932 firm-
year observations), and 894 firms with 5 years of data (4,470 firm-year observations). The number of 
unique firms is therefore 1342 (=119+96+233+894) and the total number of firm-year observations is 
5928. The unbalanced panel is not an issue for estimation purposes, and the broad results reported 
below hold for the balanced data set also. 
 
12 As noted earlier, the CSRC has approved revised executive compensation disclosure rules. From 
2006 onwards the total pay of each three highest-paid individuals will be disclosed separately. 
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The use of cash compensation is consistent with previous research (Firth et al. 2007; 
Kato et al. 2006b; Chen et al. 2010a).  
The main independent variables of interest are the performance of the firms. 
These are defined in two ways. First, we use a market-based measure (Murphy, 1999). 
This is the annualized stock return over the twelve months (SHR). An accounting-
based measure of performance is also included in the model (Core et al 1999). This is 
measured as return on assets, defined as net profits divided by the book value of 
assets (ROA). We predict these variables are positive (i.e. β1 and β2 >0). 
An important feature of our research design is the use of fixed-effects panel 
data methods to control for heterogeneity in firm and managerial quality (Wooldridge, 
2002). Cross-section regressions may omit significant explanatory variables, 
potentially causing statistical bias in the estimated pay-for-performance relation. For 
example, if managerial quality is correlated with firm performance and executive 
wages, then its omission from the pay regression may result in erroneous estimation 
of the pay-performance relation. Features such as managerial quality, corporate 
culture, or the quality of the firm are likely to be important factors in the China 
context, and are not usually measured in prior studies. In a recent paper, Graham, Li 
and Qiu (2010) report that firm fixed effects are an important determinant of 
executive compensation. In consequence our models control for firm fixed effects (the 
αi terms in equation (1)). They filter out time-invariant factors that may contaminate 
the pay-for-performance estimates.13 We also present OLS and random effects results. 
The purpose of this is to illustrate the importance of controlling for the fixed effects. 
                                                
13  Ideally we would want to control for managerial fixed effects too (see Graham et. al. 2010), but 
cannot do so because we do cannot isolate the identity of the CEO in our data. CEO fixed effects may 
control for the degree of risk aversion of managers (Conyon, Core and Guay, 2010). It may be 
especially important for those companies that issue equity to managers because these managers’ wealth 
tends to be even more concentrated in the firm they manage therefore increasing their risk aversion 
and, potentially, increasing the conflicts with shareholders. 
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The model includes a set of independent right hand side control variables, X. 
Firm size is measured as the logarithm of firm sales, SALES; Growth opportunities 
are defined as the market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets, 
MKT_BK (Smith and Watts, 1992). Firm risk is measured as the log of the standard 
deviation of stock returns over the calendar year, VOL (Core et al, 1999). We also 
control for ownership structure. State control is an indicator variable set equal to one 
if the ultimate owner is the State, and zero otherwise, STATE14. We also control for 
ownership concentration. This is measured as the share ownership of the largest 
shareholder, LG1_OWN (Shivdasani, 1993). The boardroom governance variables 
are: The percentage of the board comprised of independent directors, IND_DIR 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003). Board size is measured as the number of 
individuals on the main board, BOARD_SIZE (Yermack, 1996). The leadership 
structure of the firm is a dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and 
chairman are combined, and zero otherwise, COMBINE (Brickley et. al, 1997). The 
presence of a compensation committee is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
has a compensation committee and zero otherwise, COMP_COMM (Newman and 
Mozes, 1999). The boardroom governance variables are sourced from the SinoFin 
dataset. Finally, regression models contain a set of industry dummy variables15 to 
capture industry variation in managerial talent and a set of time dummies to capture 
year effects and macro-economic shocks. The term εit is the equation error. 
                                                
14 This variable is provided by SinoFin, who identifies the type of the ultimate owner of the firm. 
 
15  CSRC classifies industries to 13 categories: A: Agriculture and fishery, B: Mining, C: 
Manufacturing; D: Electricity, water and other energy manufacturing and supply; E: Construction; F: 
Transportation and logistics; G: Information technology; H: Wholesales and retails; I: Finance and 
insurance; J: Real estate; K: Service; L: Communication; M: Others. Firms sometimes report different 
industry classification in different years. When this occurs, the most recent year industry code is 
applied.  
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Cash compensation provides only one source of incentives for CEOs. Another 
mechanism is the incentives arising from the CEOs’ ownership of firm stock. We 
therefore estimate a CEO share ownership model. This model is the same as the cash 
compensation model in equation (1) above, except that we replace the dependent 
variable with the value of CEO shareholdings. Specifically, CEO_OWN is the natural 
logarithm of the value of CEO shareholdings. We measure incentives from share 
ownership as the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s stock wealth arising from a 
one percent change in the stock price.16 In our context it can be written as: 1% × 
(share price)×(the number of shares held). Stock ownership directly links CEO wealth 
to shareholder value and is a major component of total CEO incentives in U.S. firms 
(Conyon and Murphy 2000; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Hall and Liebman 1998). In 
China, during the time period of our study the aggregate number of options held is 
zero, so equity incentives are derived wholly from share ownership.17  
In addition, we perform a regression of the change in the logarithm of 
executive pay on the change in shareholder wealth. This is the elasticity approach to 
estimating the pay-for-performance relation (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Murphy, 
1986). The baseline model is: 
Δln(Pay)it = β0 + β1Δln(SW)it + β2ΔROAit + β3Δln(SALES)it + β4ΔXit + εit  (2) 
where ∆ln(SW) is the change in shareholder wealth between t-1 and t, and is equal to 
the continuously accrued rate of return on common stock. The term Δ is a difference 
operator: ΔXit = Xit−Xi,t-1. The estimated coefficient β1 is the elasticity of cash 
compensation with respect to shareholder value. The first-difference equation 
                                                
16 Core et al. (2003) and Baker and Hall (2004) provide a discussion of the role and types of equity 
incentives. 
 
17 If there were stock options the relevant measure is: 1% × (share price) × (the number of shares held) 
+ 1% × (share price) × (option delta) × (the number of options held). The options are weighted by the 
delta of the option, reflecting the likelihood that the option will end up in the money. 
 
 18 
implicitly eliminates time-invariant firm fixed effects. We also estimate equation (2) 
separately for State and non-State controlled firms and for firms with a high 
percentage of outside directors on the board (IND_DIR>=25%), and those firms that 
do not (IND_DIR<25%). The estimation allows the coefficient estimates on all of the 
variables to have a different effect in the separate conditions.18 
4. Empirical results for China 
Descriptive results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on executive compensation for China’s listed 
firms by year (Panel A) and broad industrial sector (Panel B). Panel A shows average 
(median) executive compensation over the 2001-2005 sample period is about 152,000 
(107,000) renminbi (RMB). Using the official 2005 exchange rate of 1 US$ = 8.20 
RMB, average (median) executive compensation over the period is approximately 
$19,000 ($13,000) US dollars. However, if one uses the Penn World Table purchasing 
power parity (PPP) rate of about 2.2 in 2005 then the US dollar amount is about 
$69,000 ($49,000).19 Although China executive pay may seem low by US standards, 
it is high compared to the typical employee wage in China. Annual average employee 
income in 2005 was about 18,000 RMB, suggesting that the ratio of executive to 
employee pay was about eight.20 
Table 1 also shows that executive pay grew from 2001 to 2005. Average 
executive compensation rose from about 105,000 RMB in 2001 to approximately 
                                                
18 It is therefore equivalent to estimating a model with a full set of interaction terms on every 
independent and control variable. 
 
19 We discuss the issue of PPP rates in Section 5 below when contrasting China to the USA. 
 
20  Annual employee pay (in RMB) was 10,870 in 2001; 12,422 in 2002; 14,040 in 2003; 16,024 in 
2004; and 18,415 in 2005. The source of the data is the China Statistical Yearbook. 
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196,000 RMB in 2004, and then fell to about 154,000 in 2005.21 To estimate the rate 
of growth in executive pay we ran a regression of the logarithm of executive pay on a 
linear time trend. The results indicate that executive pay has grown by about 10.3% 
per year over the period 2001 to 2005 (β=0.098, t=11.8)22. Finally, Panel B shows the 
distribution of compensation across broad industry groups. It is noteworthy that most 
of the firms are within the manufacturing sector. 
Table 2 gives the average values of key variables used in the study. Panel A 
provides information on executive compensation, the value of CEO share ownership, 
and boardroom structures variables, such as the percentage of independent directors 
on the board. Executive compensation and the value of CEO share ownership are 
expressed in thousands of RMB. A key point is that the value of CEO share 
ownership is higher than the level of executive pay. Over the period from 2001 to 
2005 the average value of cash compensation is about 151 thousand RMB. In 
contrast, the average value shareholding is approximately 2177 thousand RMB. The 
notional value of the stock of CEO shareholdings is about fourteen times the value of 
cash compensation. Since the value of CEO share ownership varies directly with asset 
prices, this provides an automatic mechanism to motivate CEOs to create firm value. 
The importance of equity ownership (compensation) has not been highlighted in 
previous studies of compensation in China. 
The corporate governance of China’s listed firms has changed from 2001 to 
2005. In terms of boardroom structure, we find an increased adoption of Western style 
governance practices. The percentage of independent members on the board has 
                                                
21 The full explanation for the decline in 2005 is unclear. One reason may be declining firm 
performance between 2004 and 2005, since return to shareholders and return on assets also fell over 
this time period. 
 
22 Calculated as e0.098−1. 
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increased from about 6% in 2001 to about 34% in 2005.23 The size of the main board 
of directors is about ten members and relatively constant over time. About 11% of 
firms combine the posts of CEO and chairperson over the sample period. Finally, the 
proportion of firms that have adopted a compensation committee for setting executive 
pay has increased from about 8% in 2001 to approximately 50% in 2005. As noted, 
the raw data show significant changes in the internal control and governance of firms. 
Table 2 Panel B provides further institutional context to our study. State 
ownership control has declined from 2001 to 2005.  The State was the ultimate owner 
in about 82% of firms in 2001 and only 71% in 2005. In contrast, private ownership 
and control has more than doubled over the same short period. About 27% of firms 
were privately controlled in 2005 compared to 11% in 2001. The State’s ownership 
control of firms has diminished, as market reforms deepened. The ownership of 
publicly traded firms is highly concentrated in China. For expositional purposes we 
present the ownership stakes of the largest three shareholders separately. The largest 
shareholder owns about 43% of the firms shares, the next largest about 9% and the 
third largest about 4%. The situation contrasts markedly to Anglo-Saxon economies. 
Table 3 provides the sample means and a correlation matrix of the variables used in 
the regression analysis. We note that the average stock market and accounting 
performance of these firms is quite poor. This is consistent with Firth et al (2007) who 
remarked on the “lamentable” performance of listed firms.  
Econometric results 
Table 4 documents the relation between executive compensation, firm performance, 
ownership and control. Columns (2) and (3) are the random and fixed effects 
                                                
23 The significant increase of independent directors on the board is due to the regulation issued by 
CSRC in August 2001,“Guides to the Establishment of Independent Directors System”, which mandate 
at least one third of the board members in listed firms should be independent directors. 
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estimates using current dated measures of firm performance. Columns (4) and (5) use 
lagged performance measures.24 
The cross-section results show that executive pay is positively correlated to 
firm performance. Both the shareholder returns and return on assets variables are 
significant after controlling for firm size, growth opportunities, and boardroom 
variables such as the fraction of independent directors. The models also control for 
macroeconomic effects via the time dummies and cross industry differences in the 
demand for executive talent. This evidence is consistent with the board of directors 
providing managers with incentives through cash compensation contracts in Chinese 
publicly traded firms. The results are in agreement with OLS results from prior 
research (Firth et al. 2007; Mengistae et al. 2004; Kato et al. 2006b). There is a 
positive and significant association between executive pay and firm size. The 
coefficient is an elasticity estimate and shows a 10% increase in firm revenues is 
associated with a 2% increase in pay. It is consistent with prior Anglo-Saxon research. 
Murphy’s (1999) review suggests the CEO compensation-size elasticity is typically in 
the range of 0.20 to 0.45. The cross-section results also show that pay is positively 
related to firm growth opportunities, the percentage of directors on the board and the 
presence of a compensation committee. It is negatively related to firm risk, State 
control of firms and concentrated share ownership. 
A concern with the cross section data is omitted variable bias, so we next 
estimated both random and fixed effects models.25 Using current dated performance 
we find that executive pay is related to return on assets, but not stockholder returns. 
However, when we used lagged performance variables we find that executive pay is 
                                                
24 We lagged only the performance terms since this is the variable of interest. The performance results 
are qualitatively unaltered when we lagged all the right hand side variables in columns 4 and 5. 
 
25 The random effects allow the errors to be correlated over time, but do not account directly for firm 
specific (time-invariant) factors. 
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statistically related to stock returns, but not return on assets in the fixed effects 
equation. The functional form of the estimating equation appears to be important in 
isolating the pay-performance relation. Broadly speaking, there is a correlation 
between pay and performance.  
As previously discussed, if unobservable firm heterogeneity is correlated with 
the observable variables then the estimating equation could be misspecified leading to 
omitted-variable bias. It is therefore important to control for such unobserved firm 
heterogeneities. To investigate further, we compared the OLS and random effects 
estimates with those of a fixed effects model. We find the signs of the coefficients are 
similar across the models but some variables loose significance and the estimated 
magnitude of the coefficients is sensitive to the estimation method. We find that the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates declines as one moves from the OLS to the 
random effects to the fixed effects specification. We performed a Hausman test to 
compare the OLS and random effects models to the fixed effects specification. The 
tests rejected the hypothesis that fixed effects are uncorrelated with the observable 
determinants. Also, we could not reject the hypothesis that the OLS and random 
effects estimates are inconsistent at the 1% level. Therefore, the fixed effects models 
are the appropriate specification.26 
Table 5 shows the relation between CEO share ownership, firm performance, 
ownership and control. Column (1) is the pooled sample estimated using OLS 
methods. Columns (2) and (3) are panel data random and fixed effects estimates using 
                                                
26  We also experimented with additional control variables to see if foreign ownership had an effect on 
compensation practices. We defined a dummy variable equal to one if the firm issued any B or H 
shares (mean = 0.075). It was significantly positive in the cross section regression, but insignificant in 
the preferred fixed-effects regression. We also defined a dummy variable equal to one if the ultimate 
owner was foreign (mean = 0.01). This variable was generally positive and significant, but the number 
of observations that are ultimately foreign owned is very small (=35) and represented only 8 unique 
firms in our data. See also Chen, Liu and Li (2010). 
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current dated measures of firm performance. Columns (4) and (5) use lagged 
performance measures. We find a positive cross section correlation between CEO 
share ownership incentives, stock market performance and return on assets. Better 
performing firms provide their CEOs with greater share incentives. We also find that 
CEO equity incentives and growth opportunities are positively correlated. We find 
CEO share ownership is negatively associated with ownership concentration of the 
largest shareholder. This is consistent with greater monitoring, and supports the 
hypothesis that owners use monitoring and incentives as substitute mechanisms to 
achieve optimal corporate governance goals. We also find that ownership type 
matters. CEO share ownership incentives are lower when the State is the ultimate 
owner of the firm. This is consistent with privately controlled firms providing CEOs 
with more share incentives to promote value creation. In general, the boardroom 
governance variables are not significant. Overall, the pattern of cross-sectional 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that Chinese firms attempt to set incentive 
contracts optimally to mitigate agency costs.27 
As with the pay equations we estimate random and fixed effects model, using 
both current and lagged performance. Using current performance measures we find 
that few variables are significant in the random or fixed effects specification. This 
may not be surprising if the covariates are acting as proxies for omitted variables, or if 
the included variables change slowly over time. Using lagged performance we find 
that firms with higher performance and higher firm revenues have higher CEO share 
                                                
27 We investigated the cross section data further. In un-tabulated results we found that in State 
controlled firms CEO share ownership is more likely to be correlated to accounting performance rather 
than stock market performance. In contrast in privately controlled non-State firms CEO equity 
incentives are strongly related to both stock market and accounting performance. Firm performance 
appears to be more important driver of CEO incentives in privately controlled firms. We also found 
that firms with a higher percentage of independent directors on the main board are more likely to link 
CEO equity incentives to firm performance.  
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ownership. This is consistent with firms contracting to reduce agency costs and 
motivate CEOs. The Hausman tests did not reject the hypothesis that the random 
effects estimates are inconsistent at the 1% level, and so the fixed effects model is 
preferred. As noted the lack of significance of some of the covariates is not 
unforeseen in the fixed effects specification. For example, State control has an 
important “fixed” component to it because firms do not frequently change ownership 
control and there is little within firm variation in the variable. 28 
Pay-for-performance sensitivities 
 Table 6 provides further evidence on the pay-for-performance relation by 
using the elasticities approach. We find a positive correlation between the change in 
CEO pay and the change in shareholder wealth, and the growth in accounting returns. 
The other variables in the equation are largely insignificant. As before, this may be 
expected if the variables change only slowly over time. However, there are two 
interesting exceptions. We find that firms that switch from being State controlled to 
non-State controlled have lower conditional levels of pay growth. Also we find that 
firms that adopted a compensation committee have higher rates of pay growth. 
 We next split the sample into State and non-State firms. We find the growth in 
CEO pay is positively correlated to the growth in shareholder wealth in both the State 
and non-State firms. The association between pay growth and the change in 
accounting returns is not significant. In non-tabulated results we found that there were 
some interesting differences in the cross-section data, specifically the correlation 
between pay and performance was stronger in non-State privately controlled firms.  
                                                
28 Importantly, not all firms provide equity to the CEOs (about 32% of firms provide equity and 68% 
do not). Firms that provide CEO equity have larger sales, better stock returns, less stock volatility, and 
have lower ownership concentration. These findings are based on probit regressions (where 1 = CEO 
receives equity; 0 = CEO does not receive equity). We also conducted a sensitivity analysis of the 
results in Table 5 and estimated the CEO share ownership equations using Tobit methods, taking into 
account the zero lower bound. The qualitative results we discussed in Table 5 are unaltered.  
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Table 6 also investigates the effect of independent directors on the pay-for-
performance relation (columns 4 and 5). There is a positive correlation between 
executive pay and shareholder returns in firms when there is a higher fraction of 
independent directors on the board. However, there is no correlation between pay and 
stock returns in firms with a low fraction of independent directors. This suggests that 
greater monitoring quality by the board is associated with a stronger link between pay 
and market performance. In this respect, the boardroom reforms of the early 2000s in 
China are to be welcomed, as it is associated with greater pay-for-performance. We 
also find that there is a positive correlation between executive pay and return on 
assets in firms with a low percentage of independent directors on the board. Overall, 
these fixed effects (elasticity) estimates demonstrate that there is, in general, a 
positive correlation between executive pay growth and the change in shareholder 
wealth. Also, there is some evidence that a higher fraction of independent directors on 
the main board makes the pay-performance link stronger.  
CEO turnover and firm performance in China 
The possibility of job termination for poor performance may provide additional 
incentives for CEOs to promote owner interests, beyond the alignment effects 
provided by compensation and firm equity (Murphy, 1999, Conyon, 1998). Indeed, 
one might conjecture that compensation and other job benefits are substitutes. For 
example, CEO pay may be low in China because tenure is long, or non-pecuniary 
benefits are abundant. In addition, politically connected CEOs may be insulted from 
the consequences of poor performance. As a result, CEO termination (especially in 
case of poor performance) may be rare. We therefore test whether poor performance 
is correlated with CEO replacements in our data set to rule out this alternative 
explanation for the observed pattern of CEO compensation.  
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 Following extant research we ran a probit regression of CEO turnover on firm 
performance (Murphy, 1999, Weisbach, 1988). The dependent variable is the change 
in CEO (CEO_CH), and is a binary variable equal to one if the firm replaces the CEO 
in a given year, and zero otherwise. In the data, approximately one third of Chinese 
firms replace their CEO in a given year (mean=0.33). This is higher than the CEO 
turnover reported in US studies. Kaplan and Minton (2006) report a turnover rate of 
about 17%. 
Table 7, column 1, reports the marginal effects from running a probit 
regression. We find that poorly performing firms are more likely to replace their 
CEOs. The evidence shows that market based (SHR) and accounting measures (ROA) 
are negatively correlated to CEO turnover, but only stock returns are significant. We 
conclude, that CEOs in China are disciplined for poor firm performance. Our results 
are broadly consistent with earlier studies (Kato and Long, 2006a, 2006c). 
In addition, we investigate the effect of State control and the role of 
independent directors on the likelihood that CEOs are replaced for poor performance. 
Table 7 (column 2) shows an insignificant relation of CEO turnover to stock returns 
in State controlled firms: poor stock returns are not associated with CEO replacement. 
However, CEOs are replaced for poor accounting performance. The reverse is true in 
privately controlled non-State firms (column 3). CEOs of firms with poor stock 
returns are disciplined with a higher probability of dismissal. However, there is no 
statistical link to accounting performance. It appears that privately controlled (non-
State) are more likely to use market based performance measures to discipline 
managers. 
There is also evidence that independent directors perform a useful monitoring 
function. Table 7 (column 4) shows that boards with a higher fraction of independent 
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directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. On 
the other hand, we find no relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in 
firms with a low percentage of independent directors on the board (column 5). This is 
supportive evidence of the usefulness of the institutional and governance reforms of 
the 2000s requiring increased board independence. 
5. Comparing executive pay in China to the USA 
In this section we provide the first evidence on pay differences between China and the 
US, adding to the growing literature on international executive pay. Murphy and 
Sandino (2010) compare the United States with Canada focusing on the role of 
compensation consultants. Conyon and Murphy (2000) compare the US to the UK, 
and Conyon, Core and Guay (2010) and Conyon, Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and 
Murphy (2010) compare the United States to European economies. The general idea 
in such studies is that in efficient labor markets, with few transaction costs, 
competition should lead to factor price equalization. In consequence, similar skill-
adjusted compensation should be observed across countries. Empirically, however, 
studies often document pronounced CEO pay differences across countries.  
 Clearly, the United States and China are starkly different both politically and 
in terms of governance arrangements (Fan et al, 2009; Fan et al, 2007). The Chinese 
State has significant influence over economic activity, whereas it is (usually) not the 
case in the USA. Ownership structure is highly concentrated in China and much more 
diffuse in the USA. The legal structure and origins in the USA is based on common-
law whereas it is a variant of civil law in China. Property rights are well protected in 
the United States, but much less so in China. More generally, voice and 
accountability, the quality of government and regulation, and the control of corruption 
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are all weaker in China.29 Also, the quality of accounting, auditing and earnings 
statements may be less in China compared to the US (DeFond, et al, 1999). 
Nevertheless, a comparison of executive pay between China and the USA is of 
interest. First, it helps shed some light on whether Chinese executive compensation 
design is converging to the western model. Second, it highlights differences in the 
drivers of executive pay in the two largest global economies. We perform an OLS 
regression of CEO pay on a US indicator variable, controlling for economic and 
corporate governance variables. 30 
 To conduct a like-for-like comparison we calculated the average pay of the top 
three US officers using data from Execucomp, which reports executive compensation 
information for S&P 1500 firms. A central concern is that the cost of living etc. is 
radically different between China and the USA. To partially reduce such concerns we 
adjusted the Chinese compensation data using Purchasing Power Parity exchange 
rates from the Penn World Tables. Using the PPP rates has the effect of increasing 
China’s dollar denominated executive pay compared to using the standard exchange 
rate.31 
Table 8 contrasts executive pay in China with pay in US, denominated in US 
dollars. We find that US cash compensation is approximately 17 times that of China’s 
executives over the sample period. However, if stock options and other equity pay 
earned by US CEOs are included in the measure of US pay, the ratio increases to 
                                                
29 For example, Transparency International provides a Corruption Perception Index that ranges from 0 
to 10, with higher scores meaning less corruption.  In 2005, the USA scored 7.6 and China 3.2; the 
relative global ranks were 17 for the USA and 78 for China, assessed from 158 nations. 
 
30 Fixed effects estimation is not possible in this context due to the lack of within firm variation in the 
country variable. Firms belong to either US or China and do not switch. 
 
31 The PPP rate is approximately $1:2RMB compared to the official rate which is approximately 
$1:7RMB.  
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approximately 42.32 Overall, the raw data shows that US executives earn considerably 
more than their Chinese counterparts. 
However, the descriptive statistics do not control for other factors. As shown 
in Table 8 (Panel B), there are significant differences between the US and China in 
terms of firm size, performance and corporate governance. Importantly, firm size 
(SALES) is significantly higher in the US. Since firm revenues are an important 
predictor of CEO pay it is important to control for this variable. Also, we note that 
stock returns are better in the US compared to China. US firms have a greater fraction 
of independent outsiders, are more likely to combine the posts of CEO and Chair, and 
are more apt to have a compensation committee. 
 Table 9 pools the US and China panel data. We regress the log of CEO pay on 
a US indicator variable, controlling for economic and boardroom variables as in our 
previous analysis. The independent variable of interest in Table 9 is the US indicator 
variable (=1 for USA and 0 for China) in columns 1 and 2. After controlling for 
economic factors (such as firm size, performance, growth opportunities), and board 
variables (such as board size, and leadership structure) we find that executive pay is 
significantly higher in the US compared to China. This finding is confirmed using 
both the salary plus bonus CEO pay measure (column 1) or the US total pay measure 
(column 2). The point estimate suggests that salary and bonus is approximately 775% 
higher in the US relative to China.33 When we use the US total pay measure, the US-
China gap is even larger. However, the included variables are important in dampening 
the raw US-China executive pay differential. We ran a simple linear regression of log 
salary plus bonus on the US dummy variable alone. It yielded a point estimate of 2.9, 
                                                
32 The increase is automatic since China’s executives do not receive options or restricted stock in this 
period so the denominator in the calculation remains the same. 
 
33 Calculated as e2.17-1. 
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suggesting the mean US-China pay difference is about 1770% (i.e. e2.9-1). By 
including the explanatory variables in the regression model, therefore, we account for 
about half of the observed raw differences in cash compensation between the US and 
China. However, the gap is still appreciable. 
 We next inspected the pay models for each country separately to see if the 
effects of each covariate differed across countries. The results are contained in the 
final three columns of Table 9. Comparing the coefficient estimates across the two 
countries we find that firm size, firm stock returns, firm growth opportunities, and 
firm risk all have a larger impact on executive pay in the US compared to China. We 
conclude that the determinants of executive pay have a differential impact between 
the two countries.34 In addition, the US indicator variable remains significant in all 
equations, and quantitatively large. 
 We next tested for differences between US and China pay using the propensity 
score method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al, 19987, 1998). Propensity 
score matching can alleviate selection biases arising from the non-random assignment 
of data. It does so by optimally matching Chinese firms (the treatment condition) to 
US firms (the control condition).35 We matched like-for-like firms using a nearest 
                                                
34 We also ran a regression of CEO pay on a full set of interactions between the US dummy variable 
and the economic and boardroom governance variables. In general, we found differential effects of the 
covariates on CEO pay in each country. 
 
35 Propensity matching potentially identifies causal differences between in pay between China and the 
US arising from the non-random data. Let Tit be a treatment indicator variable for firm i at time t. Set 
T=0 for the USA and T=1 for China. Define Yit(1) as CEO pay if in China and Yit(0) if the USA. The 
causal effect on CEO pay is: Yit(1) − Yit(0). The fundamental problem of causal inference is that the 
quantity Yit(0) is not observable. The pay received is not observable in the counterfactual state. The 
average treatment effect can be expressed as: E[Yit(1) − Yit(0) | Tit = 1] = E[Yit(1) | Tit = 1] − E[Yit (0) | 
Tit = 1]. The counterfactual is then estimated by the average outcome value for matching firms, i.e. 
E[Yit(0)| Tit = 0] using a logit propensity score model which we report. The effectiveness of the 
identification strategy in part depends on the success of the (logit) propensity score model to identify 
differences between the two economies. See Table 10 for the estimated propensity score logit model 
(Panel A). We could match 2211 firm-year observations on economic characteristics, and only 309 
when matching on both economic and governance characteristics (Panel B).  
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neighbor algorithm with caliper 0.05, and no replacement.36 We match the two 
samples based on two criteria: 1) matched on economic variables including sales, 
accounting and stock performance, market to book value and volatility 2) matched 
based on both economic and governance variables, including all economic variables 
listed above plus governance variables, board size, independent director, combine, 
and compensation committee. 
The results are contained in Table 10. The left part of Panel A is the logistic 
equation that predicts the propensity score. It shows that firm size, stock returns, firm 
growth opportunities, firm risk, the presence of outside directors and independent 
compensation committees are all higher in the sample of US firms compared to 
China. The right part of Panel A shows the mean of the variables after matching. For 
example, once we match on both economic and corporate governance variables we 
see that there are few differences in size, performance, governance etc. between the 
US and China. The next step is to investigate any persistent differences in executive 
compensation. Panel B compares (log) compensation (of both total pay and salary 
plus bonus) in the US and China on the optimally matched firms. We find that 
differences in CEO pay (both mean and median) persist between China and the US 
even in the matched sample context. The propensity matching strategy confirms that 
US executives still receive significantly higher compensation than Chinese 
executives, controlling for economic, governance and industry differences between 
the two countries. For example, matching on economic and governance factors the 
average log compensation in China (the treatment group) is 4.37. This compares to 
the US figure of 6.56 (the matched control group). The difference is statistically 
different. We therefore find that there are significant differences between executive 
                                                
36 Leuven, Edwin, and Barbara Sianesi (2003).  
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pay in the US and China, even using propensity score methods to match firms with 
similar characteristics. 
An important question is why US executives earn more than those in China? 
The standard economic variables used in our equations do not seem to eliminate all of 
the differences between the US and China, even though we controlled for differences 
in purchasing power. This suggests we have not controlled for all the relevant 
variables that drive compensation. At this stage we can only speculate on other 
potential reasons for these persistent differences in pay, and encourage further 
research on this topic. 
First, it may be that US-China pay differences are not only restricted to top 
executives of companies. The best candidates in all professions (such as doctors, 
athletes, lawyers, bankers, and entertainers) all earn substantially more in the US than 
in China. Such wage premiums may reflect a much more active market for superstars 
in the United States (Rosen, 1981). It may be that all professions enjoy such 
differences. 
Second, the culture of individualism is at the cornerstone of US society. US 
social norms often promote economic rewards arising from high levels of individual 
effort and risk bearing. As such the US may be characterized as a “winner-take-all” 
society (Frank and Cook, 1995). In addition, the existing evidence shows that 
incentives provided by corporate tournaments are much less pronounced in China 
than in market economies such as the US (Chen, Ezzamel and Cai, 2010)37. 
Third, important differences may arise if compensation is not measured in 
exactly the same way across the different countries. One source of measurement bias 
                                                
37 Corporate tournaments are tested in a variety of ways. In particular, the size the ‘prize’ or pay gap 
between those at the top of the firm and those further down the hierarchy for ‘winning’ the corporate 
tournament is less in China compared to the US or UK. 
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may be that Chinese executives enjoy considerable non-disclosed perks. Moreover, in 
discussing the wage differential between China and US, one should probably also 
consider social aspects such as, lack of medical expenses, school tuition fees and so 
on. This is partially controlled for using our PPP deflator that accounts for some of 
the differences in living standards. However, within the firm Chinese executives may 
enjoy substantial private benefits of control. Kato and Long (2006b) estimate that 
Chinese executive perks are about 15% to 32% of total compensation. Adithipyangkul 
et. al. (2010) estimate that the median value of perks (enjoyed by all company 
employees including management) are about 1.06 million RMB compared to total 
management compensation of 0.3 million RMB.38 A challenge for future research, as 
compensation disclosure becomes better in China, is to more accurately calculate 
CEO pay. 
Fourth, CEOs in the USA may face greater risk of being fired for poor 
performance compared to China CEOs and so require greater pay. Kaplan and Minton 
(2006) find in a sample of US firms that the CEO turnover rate is about 17.6% in 
recent times, and has been increasing. Also, the association between CEO turnover 
and firm performance has become stronger over time. This may provide some 
explanation for the significant difference in pay between the US and China. Possibly, 
if the pay is risk-adjusted (i.e. conditional on the probability of being fired) the 
difference is less striking.39 
Finally, differences in US-China executive pay may arise because of 
differences in legal origins, culture and institutional arrangements between the two 
                                                
38 The average value of company-wide perks was even higher at 4.0 million RMB. However, these 
expenditures are spread across all employees within the firm. 
 
39 This is a potentially interesting avenue for future research. At present any differences are captured in 
the US-China indicator variable. We do note, however, that the frequency of CEO turnover in China 
appears to be greater than the US, making the job more risky, and not less so, other things equal. 
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economies. These could include differences in regulatory regimes, tax and accounting 
rules. Understanding the degree of similarity, differences, and convergence in 
corporate governance regimes is, of course, complex (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 
2009). 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated executive compensation and CEO share ownership 
in China’s publically traded firms. As market reforms deepen we documented how 
firms provide incentives to their top executives. The drivers of executive 
compensation in China look surprising like that of western economies. We show that 
economic factors, such as firm size and performance, are important in China as they 
are in the US. We also show that corporate governance in China is mimicking 
important features of boards in the US, such as the adoption of independent directors 
and compensation committees. We document a number of salient findings. 
First, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm 
performance. The result is an agreement with agency theory. We stressed the 
importance of using firm fixed-effects to control for heterogeneity in firm and 
managerial quality. Second, we find that CEO share ownership is an important 
mechanism to align owner and managerial interests. The nominal value of CEO share 
ownership is significantly higher than executive cash compensation. Third, we show 
that executive pay and CEO ownership incentives are lower in State controlled firms 
and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Fourth, we find that boardroom 
governance is also important. Firms with more independent directors on the board 
have a higher pay-for-performance link. Fifth, we find that CEO turnover is 
negatively correlated to firm performance. CEOs in China are therefore disciplined 
for poor firm performance. Importantly, privately controlled firms and firms with 
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more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor 
performance.  Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about 
seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US-China pay persist 
even after controlling for economic and governance factors. This suggests that 
unobserved variables such as social norms, institutions and private benefits of control 
in China might be important.  
Often there is a suspicion that China’s corporate governance reforms are 
merely window-dressing and ineffective. For years, investors criticized poor corporate 
governance structures and the lack of managerial incentives to promote shareholder 
value. Overall, our results suggest that, so far, China’s corporate governance reforms 
have been helpful in aligning managerial interests with shareholders, although we 
think that the reforms could deepen further. One cautionary note is that our study was 
limited to 2001 to 2005. Because new data on stock options and other equity pay has 
become available since 2006 we recommend further analysis in this area. Despite this, 
our study provides the first evidence comparing CEO pay in China to the US, as well 
as documenting the pay-for-performance relation after controlling for heterogeneity in 
firm and managerial quality. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics: executive compensation 
Panel A  
Year N Mean sd Lower 
quartile 
Median Upper 
quartile 
       
2001 1017 104975 217392 38467 71000 126000 
2002 1147 127558 127181 50516 90000 163333 
2003 1217 162881 153353 66800 120033 212667 
2004 1318 195745 183175 81667 146214 250667 
2005 1229 153512 194846 57567 107684 193333 
       
Total 5928 151477 179778 57333 106667 192700 
       
Panel B 
Industry N Mean sd Lower 
quartile 
Median Upper 
quartile 
       
Agriculture 143 94667 62669 52400 80000 122533 
Communication 49 146733 109876 56000 133333 203333 
Construction 105 154867 120206 68825 132717 200000 
Finance 23 86030 57475 30000 73333 133200 
Information 
Technology 
359 214219 217880 100000 160000 251000 
Manufacturing 3402 139662 193994 50533 93602 170167 
Mining 95 126937 96534 57333 106667 152081 
Others 369 153411 120238 66000 123000 200000 
Real estate 276 183101 183907 62200 129500 261717 
Services 173 208055 199898 83000 149329 273868 
Transportation 247 171156 137938 67948 122033 223333 
Utilities 251 166132 151276 68155 123333 213333 
Wholesale & 
Retail 
436 155455 132128 64000 115808 206667 
       
Total 5928 151477 179778 57333 106667 192700 
 
Executive Compensation is average executive compensation.  It is the sum of three highest 
paid executive members’ total compensation disclosed a single number divided by three. 
Executive compensation is calculated as the sum of basic salary, bonus, stipends, and other 
benefits. Executive compensation is denominated in Chinese RMB. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics: Compensation, ownership and control 
 
Panel A: Executive compensation and boardroom structure 
Year PAY 
(RMB 
000s) 
CEO_ 
OWN 
(RMB 
000s) 
BOARD_ 
SIZE 
IND_DIR 
(%) 
COMBINE COMP_ 
COM 
       
2001 104.97 767.30 9.40 5.97 0.12 0.08 
2002 127.56 1375.27 9.92 23.65 0.11 0.31 
2003 162.88 1979.39 9.89 32.36 0.11 0.42 
2004 195.75 3285.02 9.80 33.82 0.11 0.46 
2005 153.51 3150.18 9.66 34.34 0.11 0.51 
       
Total 151.48 2187.57 9.74 26.88 0.11 0.37 
 
Panel B: Ownership 
Year STATE PRIVATE OTHER LG1_OWN LG2_OWN LG3_OWN 
       
2001 0.82 0.11 0.07 0.44 0.08 0.03 
2002 0.78 0.16 0.06 0.44 0.09 0.03 
2003 0.74 0.22 0.04 0.43 0.09 0.04 
2004 0.70 0.26 0.04 0.42 0.10 0.04 
2005 0.71 0.27 0.02 0.41 0.10 0.04 
       
Total 0.74 0.21 0.05 0.43 0.09 0.04 
 
Panel A: PAY: CEO cash pay (RMB 000s); CEO_OWN (RMB 000s): value of CEO 
shareholdings is the number of shares held by the CEO multiplied by the firms stock price 
(units = millions). IND_DIR: the fraction of the board comprised of independent directors; 
BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the number of individuals on the main board. 
COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a dummy variable set equal to one if the posts 
of CEO and chairman are combined, and zero otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm has a compensation committee and zero otherwise. STATE=1 if the 
Chinese State is the ultimate firm owner. PRIVATE=1 if the ultimate owner is a private 
institution; OTHER is the residual ownership category. LG1_OWN: the percentage 
ownership of largest shareholder. LG2_OWN and LG3_OWN are the second and third largest 
ownership percentages. 
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix 
 
 Variable Mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
                
1 Ln(PAY) 11.54 0.89 1.00            
2 ANNRET -0.16 0.24 0.17 1.00           
3 ROA 0.01 0.28 0.13 0.17 1.00          
4 LSALES 20.32 1.39 0.39 0.25 0.22 1.00         
5 MKT_BK 1.57 1.40 -0.14 0.08 -0.26 -0.37 1.00        
6 VOL -1.15 0.35 -0.07 -0.06 -0.13 -0.16 -0.07 1.00       
7 STATE 0.74 0.44 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.22 -0.04 -0.08 1.00      
8 LG1_OWN 0.43 0.17 -0.05 0.10 0.10 0.26 0.00 -0.12 0.33 1.00     
9 IND_DIR 26.88 12.64 0.21 0.11 -0.03 0.08 -0.32 0.14 -0.14 -0.06 1.00    
10 BOARD_SIZE 9.74 2.26 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.21 -0.08 -0.05 0.13 0.00 -0.05 1.00   
11 COMBINE 0.11 0.31 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 1.00  
12 COMP_COMM 0.37 0.48 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.07 -0.14 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.26 0.08 -0.01 1.00 
 
Ln(PAY) is the log of executive pay. SHR: annual shareholder returns; ROA: Return on assets; SALES: log of firm sales; MKT_BK: market value of the firm 
divided by the book value of assets; VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year. STATE: dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm’s ultimate owner is the Chinese State, and zero otherwise; LG1_OWN: Percentage share ownership of the largest shareholder; IND_DIR: the fraction of 
the board comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership 
structure of the firm is a dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and zero otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm has a compensation committee and zero otherwise. 
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Table 4 
Executive compensation regressions: China 2001 to 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ln(PAY) 
Pooled OLS 
ln(PAY) 
Random 
Effects. 
Current 
performance 
ln(PAY) 
Fixed 
Effects. 
Current 
performance 
ln(PAY) 
Random 
Effects 
Lagged 
performance 
ln(PAY) 
Fixed 
Effects. 
Lagged 
performance 
SHR 0.14*** 0.01 -0.02 0.05* 0.05* 
 (2.79) (0.33) (-0.63) (1.79) (1.66) 
ROA 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.08** 0.06 
 (3.28) (3.60) (3.65) (2.21) (1.62) 
SALES 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 
 (22.90) (10.03) (4.88) (9.86) (4.67) 
MKT_BK 0.06*** 0.04** 0.03** 0.02 0.01 
 (4.07) (2.24) (2.23) (1.17) (0.91) 
VOL -0.07** -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
 (-2.03) (-1.16) (-0.61) (-1.27) (-0.83) 
STATE -0.05** -0.06* -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 
 (-2.06) (-1.77) (-1.56) (-1.07) (-1.06) 
LG1_OWN -0.67*** -0.50*** -0.44** -0.52*** -0.49** 
 (-9.88) (-4.55) (-2.22) (-4.65) (-2.44) 
IND_DIR 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (3.74) (1.55) (0.74) (1.63) (0.95) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (1.16) (0.76) (-0.07) (1.02) (0.14) 
COMBINE 0.09*** 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 
 (2.99) (1.49) (0.72) (1.60) (0.90) 
COMP_COMM 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
 (5.50) (4.00) (3.31) (3.99) (3.11) 
Constant 5.24*** 7.11*** 8.51*** 7.09*** 8.58*** 
 (17.14) (17.24) (14.82) (17.32) (14.78) 
Observations 5928 5928 5928 5653 5653 
R-squared 0.29 . 0.26 . 0.25 
Industry effects Yes Yes No Yes No 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
firms 
1342 1342 1342 1342 1342 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable ln(PAY) is the log of executive pay. The 
independent variables are: SHR: annual shareholder returns; ROA: Return on assets; SALES: 
log of firm sales; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets; 
VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year. STATE: dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm’s ultimate owner is the Chinese State, and zero otherwise; 
LG1_OWN: Percentage share ownership of the largest shareholder; IND_DIR: the fraction of 
the board comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the 
number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and zero 
otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a compensation 
committee and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of 13 industry variables and a set 
of 4 time dummies, from 2002 to 2005, with 2001 as the base year. Coefficients on the 
industry and time dummies are suppressed for expositional convenience. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted and clustered on the firm identifier. 
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Table 5 
CEO share ownership and firm performance in China’s publicly traded firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CEO_OWN 
Pooled OLS 
CEO_OWN 
Random 
Effects. 
CEO_OWN 
Fixed 
Effects. 
CEO_OWN 
Random 
Effects. 
CEO_OWN 
Fixed 
Effects. 
  Current 
performance 
Current 
performance 
Lagged 
performance 
Lagged 
performance 
      
SHR 0.13*** -0.00 -0.01 0.02* 0.02* 
 (3.36) (-0.16) (-0.50) (1.85) (1.77) 
ROA 0.13*** 0.03* 0.02 0.01*** 0.01** 
 (4.95) (1.90) (1.28) (2.96) (2.00) 
SALES 0.02*** 0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 
 (3.54) (1.41) (1.67) (1.57) (1.93) 
MKT_BK 0.03*** 0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (3.95) (2.06) (1.54) (1.27) (0.92) 
VOL -0.02 -0.03 -0.03* -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.65) (-1.62) (-1.67) (-0.12) (-0.43) 
STATE -0.18*** -0.05*** -0.01 -0.03** 0.00 
 (-7.38) (-3.42) (-0.43) (-2.20) (0.32) 
LG1_OWN -0.41*** -0.31*** -0.10 -0.15* 0.00 
 (-7.79) (-3.40) (-0.90) (-1.90) (0.03) 
IND_DIR 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.67) (-0.52) (-0.61) (0.12) (0.00) 
BOARD_SIZE -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.21) (1.14) (1.47) (1.24) (1.44) 
COMBINE 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (4.53) (3.30) (2.90) (3.01) (2.60) 
COMP_COMM 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (-0.79) (-0.50) (-1.27) (-1.14) 
Constant -0.09 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 
 (-0.73) (0.01) (-0.66) (0.35) (-0.47) 
Observations 5928 5928 5928 5653 5653 
Number of 
firms 
1342 1342 1342 1342 1342 
Industry effects Yes Yes No Yes No 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.06 . 0.02 . 0.03 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable CEO_OWN is the log of (1 + the value of the 
CEO share ownership). SHR: annual shareholder returns; ROA: Return on assets; SALES: 
log of firm sales; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets; 
VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year. STATE: dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm’s ultimate owner is the Chinese State, and zero otherwise; 
LG1_OWN: Percentage share ownership of the largest shareholder; IND_DIR: the fraction of 
the board comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the 
number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and zero 
otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a compensation 
committee and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of 13 industry variables and a set 
of 4 time dummies, from 2002 to 2005, with 2001 as the base year. Coefficients on the 
industry and dummies are suppressed for expositional convenience. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted and clustered on the firm identifier. 
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Table 6 
Pay-for-performance sensitivities in China’s publicly traded firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Δln(PAY)  
 
All Firms 
Δln(PAY) 
State 
controlled 
firms 
Δln(PAY)  
Non-State 
controlled 
firms 
Δln(PAY)  
Independent 
Directors 
≥25% 
Δln(PAY) 
Independent 
Directors 
<25% 
      
Δln(SW) 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.13* 0.18*** 0.19 
 (5.06) (5.36) (1.70) (4.87) (1.42) 
ΔROA 0.05* 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.17* 
 (1.75) (0.75) (1.29) (1.30) (1.75) 
ΔSALES 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.14** 
 (6.17) (3.90) (4.03) (5.80) (2.45) 
ΔMKT_BK -0.02 -0.04** -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
 (-1.39) (-2.25) (-0.61) (-1.53) (0.06) 
ΔVOL -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 
 (-0.70) (-0.77) (-0.28) (-0.50) (-0.62) 
ΔSTATE -0.08** -0.19*** -0.10** -0.08** -0.06 
 (-2.48) (-3.25) (-2.10) (-2.28) (-0.46) 
ΔLG1_OWN 0.04 -0.13 0.36 0.11 -0.92 
 (0.25) (-0.67) (1.20) (0.67) (-1.63) 
ΔIND_DIR 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.52) (-0.83) (1.76) (0.86) (-0.67) 
ΔBOARD_SIZE 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03* 
 (1.13) (0.78) (0.81) (0.55) (1.86) 
ΔCOMBINE 0.02 0.07* -0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.68) (1.73) (-0.61) (0.71) (0.15) 
ΔCOMP_COMM 0.07** 0.08*** 0.04 0.05* 0.17** 
 (2.49) (2.75) (0.67) (1.71) (2.55) 
Constant -0.28** 0.27** -0.02 0.23 -0.39 
 (-2.18) (2.14) (-0.08) (1.64) (-1.62) 
Industry & time 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4586 3362 1224 4139 447 
R-squared 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.21 0.11 
 
The dependent variable Δln(PAY) is the change log of executive cash pay. ∆ln(SW) is the 
change in shareholder wealth and is equal to the continuously accrued rate of return on 
common stock; ΔROA: is the change in return on assets; ΔSALES: is the change in the log of 
firm sales. Δ is the first-difference operator and is applied to other right-hand side variables 
too. MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets; VOL: natural 
log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year. STATE: dummy variable equal to 
one if the firm’s ultimate owner is the Chinese State, and zero otherwise; LG1_OWN: 
Percentage share ownership of the largest shareholder; IND_DIR: the fraction of the board 
comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the number of 
individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a dummy 
variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and zero otherwise; 
COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a compensation committee 
and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of 13 industry variables and a set of time 
dummies. Standard errors are adjusted and clustered on the firm identifier. 
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Table 7 
CEO Turnover in China 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CEO_CH 
 
All Firms 
CEO_CH 
State 
controlled 
firms 
CEO_CH 
Non-State 
controlled 
firms 
CEO_CH 
Independent 
Directors 
≥25% 
CEO_CH 
Independent 
Directors 
<25% 
      
SHR -0.06** -0.04 -0.13** -0.08** -0.00 
 (-2.25) (-1.12) (-2.14) (-2.53) (-0.06) 
ROA -0.05 -0.13** -0.00 -0.05 -0.04 
 (-1.50) (-2.20) (-0.03) (-1.21) (-0.83) 
SALES -0.02*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.02** -0.02* 
 (-3.03) (-1.29) (-3.46) (-2.38) (-1.76) 
MKT_BK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.35) (0.08) (0.51) (0.57) (-0.45) 
VOL 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.16*** 
 (5.55) (4.41) (2.84) (3.66) (4.30) 
STATE -0.03*   -0.01 -0.08** 
 (-1.68)   (-0.66) (-2.47) 
LG1_OWN -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.11 
 (-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.53) (0.48) (-1.54) 
IND_DIR 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.83) (0.84) (-0.02) (1.26) (-0.55) 
BOARD_SIZE -0.01* -0.00 -0.01* -0.01* -0.00 
 (-1.87) (-1.33) (-1.87) (-1.93) (-0.72) 
COMBINE -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.20*** 
 (-6.76) (-5.97) (-3.22) (-4.08) (-5.78) 
COMP_COMM 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.00 
 (1.19) (1.43) (0.07) (1.61) (-0.12) 
Industry & time 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5928 4411 1517 3993 1935 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable CEO_CH =1 if there is a change in the CEO in 
firm i during year t. SHR: annual shareholder returns; ROA: Return on assets; SALES: log of 
firm sales; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets; VOL: 
natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year. STATE: dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm’s ultimate owner is the Chinese State, and zero otherwise; 
LG1_OWN: Percentage share ownership of the largest shareholder; IND_DIR: the fraction of 
the board comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the 
number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and zero 
otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a compensation 
committee and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of 13 industry variables and a set 
of 4 time dummies, from 2002 to 2005, with 2001 as the base year. Coefficients on the 
industry and time dummies are suppressed for expositional convenience. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted and clustered on the firm identifier. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive statistics: China and the US S&P 1500 firms 
 
Panel A: Executive compensation (median) 
Year China US 
Cash pay 
Ratio 
Col. (2)÷(1) 
US 
Total pay 
Ratio 
Col. (4)÷(1) 
      
2001 $33,565 $687,885 20 $1,915,779 57 
2002 $43,075 $758,806 18 $1,981,736 46 
2003 $56,775 $830,335 15 $1,990,033 35 
2004 $66,274 $907,517 14 $2,215,925 33 
2005 $48,329 $966,042 20 $2,323,643 48 
       
Total $49,775 $837,496 17 $2,094,315 42 
      
 
Panel B: Firm and governance characteristics (median) 
Variable China US P value of t test 
SALES 961.367 5,642.612 0.000*** 
SHR -0.004 0.027 0.000*** 
ROA -0.160 0.166 0.000*** 
MKT_BK 1.570 1.330 0.000*** 
BOARD_SIZE 9.743 9.346 0.000*** 
IND_RATIO 0.269 0.693 0.000*** 
COMBINE 0.110 0.596 0.000*** 
COMP_COMM 0.368 0.981 0.000*** 
Panel A: The Chinese compensation is translated from RMB to US $ using average PPP 
exchange rates within the sample period. The PPP exchange rate is based on Penn World 
Table. 2001: 2.1153; 2002: 2.0894; 2003: 2.1142; 2004: 2.2062: 2005: 2.2281. The 
compensation data for U.S companies are calculated for S&P1500 firms using the 
ExecuComp database. The compensation of the three highest paid executives is calculated as 
in the Chinese data. 
 
Panel B: Median values reported in the table. SALES: firm sales (millions$); SHR: annual 
shareholder returns; ROA: Return on assets; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by 
the book value of assets; IND_DIR: the fraction of the board comprised of independent 
directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the number of individuals on the main 
board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a dummy variable set equal to one if the 
posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and zero otherwise (average value reported); 
COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a compensation committee 
and zero otherwise (average value reported). 
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Table 9 
Executive pay in China and the US: Pooled OLS results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled 
Ln(PAY) 
Pooled 
Ln(PAY) 
USA 
Ln(PAY) 
USA 
Ln(PAY) 
China 
Ln(PAY) 
 US= 
salary+bonus 
 
US=total 
pay 
US= 
salary+bonus 
US=total 
pay 
 
US 2.17*** 2.80***    
 (79.64) (89.10)    
SHR 0.08*** -0.04* 0.10*** -0.02 0.13*** 
 (4.35) (-1.65) (4.27) (-0.99) (2.69) 
ROA 0.13** 0.11 -0.04 -0.22 0.19*** 
 (1.97) (1.30) (-0.26) (-1.53) (3.12) 
SALES 0.28*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.46*** 0.25*** 
 (49.34) (50.10) (53.82) (63.28) (23.14) 
MKT_BK 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.15*** 0.06*** 
 (7.73) (9.19) (7.92) (8.63) (3.97) 
VOL -0.04** 0.17*** 0.04** 0.39*** -0.06* 
 (-2.29) (8.82) (2.35) (15.58) (-1.77) 
IND_DIR 0.23*** 0.54*** -0.08** 0.13** 0.59*** 
 (5.65) (10.57) (-2.16) (2.23) (4.17) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01* 
 (4.67) (3.93) (3.15) (1.77) (1.75) 
COMPBINE 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (5.87) (4.01) (7.22) (5.34) (3.22) 
COMP_COMM 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.06 0.15** 0.12*** 
 (6.85) (7.89) (0.96) (2.00) (5.57) 
Constant 1.89*** 1.63*** 3.99*** 4.16*** 2.03*** 
 (34.91) (20.64) (47.26) (36.74) (13.53) 
Industry and 
time effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12552 12552 6629 6629 5928 
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.57 0.51 0.27 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable ln(PAY) is the log of executive pay. The 
independent variables are: SALES: log of firm sales; SHR: annual shareholder returns; ROA: 
Return on assets; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets; 
VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year.  IND_DIR: the 
fraction of the board comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is 
measured as the number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of 
the firm is a dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, 
and zero otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a 
compensation committee and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of industry 
variables and a set of time dummies. Standard errors are adjusted and clustered on the firm 
identifier. 
 
 45 
Table 10 
Panel A: Propensity Score Analysis: China-USA executive pay 
 Logit: 
China=1 
Logit: 
China=1 
 Mean Matched on 
Economic Variables 
Mean Matched on 
Economic and 
Governance Variables 
    China US China US 
SALES -0.53*** -0.42***  2,072.357 1,858.385 2,259.601 2,818.091 
 (-46.17) (-15.50)      
SHR -1.66*** -1.29***  0.017 0.020 0.038 0.030 
 (-32.64) (-12.63)      
ROA 0.26 0.00  -0.041 -0.022 0.076 0.036 
 (3.44) (0.00)      
MKT_BK 0.04*** -0.061**  1.258 1.320 1.344 1.387 
 (3.12) (-2.32)      
VOL -1.60*** -1.08***  -1.022 -1.025 -1.048 -1.064 
 (-42.63) (-13.13)      
BOARD_SIZE  0.10***  10.052 9.104 9.304 9.430 
  (7.10)      
IND_DIR  -10.81***  0.286 0.684 0.375 0.388 
  (-34.58)      
COMBINE  -1.16***  0.108 0.588*** 0.327 0.265 
  (-15.72)      
COMP_COMM  -1.98***  0.395 0.976*** 0.887 0.893 
  (-18.56)      
Time dummies Yes Yes      
Observations 12560 12560      
Pseudo R sq. 0.4105 0.8788      
        
*** is statistically different from previous column 
 
Panel B: Compensation difference between treatment Chinese firms and matched US firms 
 Matched on 
Economic 
Characteristics  
Matched on 
Economic and 
Governance 
Characteristics 
Number of treatment firm-year observations 2211 309 
Number of matched firm-year observations 2211 309 
Mean of treatment log(comp.) 4.12 4.37 
Mean of matched  Log (total comp.) 7.31 7.27 
Log (salary+bonus) 6.49 6.56 
t test / 
p value 
Log (total comp.) 122.52*** 41.75*** 
Log (salary+bonus) 
 
100.83*** 35.67*** 
Median of treatment log(comp.) 4.18 4.37 
Median of matched  Log (total comp.) 7.26 7.26 
Log (salary+bonus) 6.46 6.46 
z test  
p value 
Log (total comp.) 57.20*** 21.25*** 
Log (salary+bonus) 56.37*** 20.78*** 
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Variable definitions: The dependent variable for the logit equation =1 if the country is China 
and 0 for the USA. The independent variables are: SALES: log of firm sales; SHR: annual 
shareholder returns; ROA: Return on assets; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by 
the book value of assets; VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the 
year. IND_DIR: the fraction of the board comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: 
Board size is measured as the number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: 
leadership structure of the firm is a dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and 
chairman are combined, and zero otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one 
if the firm has a compensation committee and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted 
and clustered on the firm identifier. *** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * 
significant at 0.10 level. 
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